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FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE V. ADAMS:
CONCURRENT CAUSATION AND THE
ALL-RISK HOMEOWNER'S POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
The "all-risk" homeowner's policy protects the policyholder against
all fortuitous losses to covered property except as specifically excluded in
the insurance contract.' The "all-risk" policy is the most comprehensive
coverage available to the homeowner,2 and represents a significant source
of insurance company revenues.' This Note examines two conflicting
standards for determining coverage under an all-risk policy where several
causes-some included and some excluded-combine to produce a loss.
Specifically, it examines the confusion created by these two standards of
coverage, the resulting economic effects and the need for judicial
clarification.
The first standard, the efficient proximate cause theory promulgated
by the California Supreme Court in Sabella v. Wisler4 prescribes insurer
liability whenever an included peril is the moving or efficient cause of the
insured's loss.' The second standard, the concurrent cause theory enun-
ciated by the same court in State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co.
v. Partridge,6 provides coverage for the insured whenever an included
peril is a concurrent proximate cause of the loss.' The application of the
concurrent cause standard was extended by the court of appeal in Pre-
mier Insurance Co. v. Welch I and recently seconded by the same court in
1. H. DENENBERG, RISK AND INSURANCE 456 (2d ed. 1974). A fortuitous loss is one
which occurs unexpectedly or by chance. Thus, the intentional destruction or normal deterio-
ration of property due to every day wear and tear are not covered losses under an "all-risk"
policy. Id.
2. Id. The basic policy provides coverage against damage to the insured's dwelling and
its contents, loss due to theft, and protection against personal liability arising out of or related
to the insured property. Id. at 462.
3. Id.
4. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). See infra notes 36-50 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Sabella.
5. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
6. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973). See infra notes 51-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Partridge.
7. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
8. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983). See infra notes 73-80 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Welch.
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Farmers Insurance Exchange Co. v. Adams.9
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The "All-Risk" Homeowner's Policy
The homeowner's policy with multiple lines of coverage is a rela-
tively recent development in the insurance field. ° Prior to 1950, state
legislation and industry custom prevented insurance companies from is-
suing casualty and fire insurance in a single policy. I I By the early 1950's
most states had enacted legislation enabling a single company to provide
all types of coverage, and "all-risk" policies quickly became a primary
form of property insurance. 2
The popularity of all-risk property insurance lies in its blanket cov-
erage. Unless a loss is specifically excluded, 3 the policy will cover it.
This is attractive to homeowners who have little ability to identify and
specify individual perils to their property, particularly as society grows
more complex.1
4
Insurers have typically excluded coverage for only a small class of
perils-earthquakes, earth movement, floods, nuclear accidents and
wars-which present the potential for catastrophic loss and total deple-
tion of insurance funds. The insurance industry has determined that cov-
erage against these disasters cannot be provided at premiums which the
average homeowner would be able to afford. 5 Thus, under a typical
"all-risk" policy, a home destroyed by an earthquake, an excluded peril,
is not an insured loss. However, coverage determinations are not always
so clear, particularly where multiple perils contribute to the harm.
B. Multiple Causation: Dual Standards
Determining coverage under an all-risk policy becomes difficult
where both included and excluded perils combine to produce the home-
owner's loss. The California Supreme Court has articulated two different
9. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985). See infra notes 82-92 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Adams.
10. H. DENENBERG, supra note 1, at 462.
11. Id. at 461. For a detailed history of the development of "all-risk" property coverage,
see H. DENENBERG, supra note 1, at 455-67.
12. Id. at 461.
13. Id. at 455. The "specified perils" contract explicitly sets forth the causes of a loss for
which coverage is provided. If a peril is not enumerated in the policy, the resulting loss is not
insured. Id. at 448.
14. Id. at 455.
15. In some instances, such as a nuclear accident, it may be financially impossible for the
insurance industry to provide coverage at any premium, so large is the potential for disaster.
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coverage standards applicable to harms caused by multiple perils: the
efficient proximate cause theory; and the concurrent cause theory.1 6
1. The "efficient proximate cause" standard
The efficient proximate cause theory, adopted by the California
Supreme Court in 1963,17 has its origins in the California Insurance
Code enacted in 1935.18 With respect to proximate and remote causes,
section 530 of the Insurance Code states that:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured
against was the proximate cause, although a peril not contem-
plated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the
loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured
against was only a remote cause. 19
Section 532, regarding specially excluded perils states that "if a peril is
specially excepted in a contract of insurance and there is a loss which
would not have occurred but for such a peril, such loss is thereby ex-
cepted even though the immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was
not excepted." 0 Unfortunately, these sections were enacted without leg-
islative comment as to their purpose and application. Early case law,
however, provides insight into their interpretation.
In Pacific Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire In-
surance Co. of Brooklyn,2 the insured's property was destroyed by a fire
which resulted from the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. 2 The policy in
question contained an exclusion for "loss or damage occasioned by or
through any volcano, earthquake, or hurricane, or other eruption, con-
vulsion, or disturbance."23 The insurer claimed that the fire and the re-
sulting loss would not have occurred but for the earthquake and, thus,
16. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 811 (1973) (the concurrent cause standard); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d
889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) (the efficient proximate cause standard).
17. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689. See infra notes 36-50 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case.
18. See 0. Becker, P. Levin & C. Holland, Concurrent Causation: Garvey v. State Farm
and Where It Will Lead 14 (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review). The California Insurance Code was derived from the 1872 California Civil
Code. The Civil Code was adopted from the New York Civil Code, whose origins can be
found in British and American common law. Id.
19. CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1972).
20. Id. § 532 (emphasis added).
21. 158 Cal. 367, 111 P. 4 (1910).
22. Id. at 369, Il P. at 4.
23. Id.
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that the exclusionary clause operated to deny coverage.24 The California
Supreme Court rejected the insurer's strict "but for" interpretation of
California Insurance Code section 532,25 holding that Code sections 530
and 532 must be read together.26 The court explained that under section
530, the included peril and proximate cause of the loss was fire, and con-
cluded that coverage was available even though the earthquake was a
remote cause of the harm. 27 With regard to the excluded peril (section
2628), the court stated:
According to the theory of appellant, if a very slight shock of
earthquake had upset a lamp and thus set fire to a building, and
this building should communicate the fire to an adjoining build-
ing, and thence from building to building until the whole city
had burned, not a dollar of insurance could be recovered if the
policies each contained the clause under discussion. We do not
think that either the plaintiff or the defendant ever contem-
plated making any such contract. 28
The court found for the insured and refused to broaden the scope of the
exclusion through the use of section 532.29
In Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,3° the plaintiff's indem-
nity policy provided coverage for accidental death, but not for death con-
tributed to or caused by incurable illness.3 The insured was killed in a
fire after having been diagnosed as suffering from terminal cancer.32 The
insurance company attempted to deny coverage claiming that the insured
had failed to prove, as required by the policy, that his death was not
caused or contributed to by his infirmity. The Brooks court refused to
embrace the insurance company's construction of the policy stating that
"the presence of preexisting disease or infirmity will not relieve the in-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 372-73, 111 P. at 6. The court was actually interpreting California Civil Code
sections 2628 and 2626, which were later adopted in their entirety as Insurance Code sections
532 and 530, respectively.
26. Id. at 372, 111 P. at 6.
27. Id. at 373, 111 P. at 6.
28. Id. at 372, 111 P. at 6.
29. Id. at 373, 111 P. at 6.
30. 27 Cal. 2d 305, 163 P.2d 689 (1945).
31. Id. at 306, 163 P.2d at 689-90.
32. Id. at 307, 163 P.2d at 690.
33. Id. at 309, 163 P.2d at 691. The insurance company apparently relied on a line of
federal cases which precluded recovery if death would not have occurred as a result of the
accident but for the insured's preexisting disease. Id.; Ryan v. Continental Casualty Co., 47
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1931); Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Fulton, 79 F. 423 (2d
Cir. 1897).
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surer from liability if the accident is the proximate cause of death...."
The court defined proximate cause as the "prime or moving cause."
'3 5
In 1967, in Sabella v. Wisler,36 the California Supreme Court first
enunciated the efficient proximate cause standard. There, the plaintiffs'
home was severely damaged due to the subsidence of the earth beneath
it.37 The defendant, National Union Fire Insurance Company, had is-
sued the plaintiffs an "all physical loss" policy which excluded coverage
for loss due to "settling, cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements,
foundations, walls, floors, or ceilings, unless loss by ... collapse of build-
ings ensues."38 The plaintiffs' home had been constructed on improperly
filled and compacted soil due to the negligence of the defendant contrac-
tor Wisler.39 Shortly thereafter, a sewer line ruptured near the home's
foundation causing water to escape and saturate the fill.' The trial court
held that the cause of the ruptured sewer was either the settling of the
earth upon which the sewer line was placed, the improper construction of
the sewer line itself, or a combination of these two causes.41 The trial
court expressly held that the settling of the surrounding earth was due to
the infiltration of water from the leaky sewer pipe,42 but that the result-
ing damage to the insured home was caused by "settling" and was thus
exempt from coverage under the policy.
4 3
On appeal, the insurer denied liability based upon section 532 of the
California Insurance Code.' The insurer argued that but for the opera-
tion of the excluded peril-settling-plaintiffs' loss would not have oc-
curred, and accordingly, the loss was exempt from coverage. The court
rejected this argument stating that "section 532 must be read in conjunc-
tion with related section 530 of the Insurance Code."45
The court maintained that the insurer's construction of section
532-that loss proximately caused by an insured peril is exempt from
coverage if the loss would not have occurred "but for" the operation of
an excepted peril-is directly contrary to section 530 and would render
34. Brooks, 27 Cal. 2d at 309, 163 P.2d at 691.
35. Id. at 310, 163 P.2d at 691.
36. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
37. Id. at 24, 377 P.2d at 890, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
38. Id. at 26, 377 P.2d at 891-92, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
39. Id. at 24-25, 377 P.2d at 890-91, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
40. Id. at 26, 377 P.2d at 892, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 26-27, 377 P.2d at 892, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
43. Id. at 24, 377 P.2d at 890, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
44. Id. at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
45. Id. (citing Pacific Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 158
Cal. 367, 372, 111 P. 4, 6 (1910)); see supra notes 21-29.
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that section meaningless.46 Further, it reasoned that "the specially ex-
cepted peril alluded to in section 532 as that 'but for' which the loss
would not have occurred, is the peril proximately causing the loss."
47
The California Supreme Court found that "the rupture of the sewer
line [was] attributable to the negligence of a third party, rather than set-
tling, [and] was the efficient proximate cause of the loss." ' "8 The court
held that:
[I]n determining whether a loss is within an exception in a pol-
icy, where there is a concurrence of different causes, the effi-
cient cause-the one that sets others in motion-is the cause to
which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may
follow it, and operate more immediately in producing the
disaster.49
Following the Sabella decision, the efficient proximate cause analy-
sis appeared to be the appropriate method for determining coverage
under an "all-risk" policy." No other standard was promulgated until
ten years later.
46. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696. Section 530 allows the
insured to recover for losses proximately caused by an included peril even though an excluded
peril may have been a remote cause of the loss. Thus, a "but for" construction of § 532 would
negate the affordance of coverage under § 530. For example, in Pacific Heating, had the court
applied a strict interpretation of § 532, the insured would not have been able to recover for the
destruction of the insured property by fire (an included peril) because the fire was initially
caused by an earthquake (an excluded peril). Pacific Heating, 158 Cal. at 369, 111 P. at 4. The
loss was proximately caused by fire and only remotely caused by the earthquake; however, the
damage to the insured property would not have occurred "but for" the earthquake. Id. at 371,
111 P. at 5. The court rejected a "but for" interpretation of § 532 stating that § 532 must be
read in conjunction with § 530. Id. at 372, 111 P. at 6. The court held that the insured's loss
was covered under the policy because it was proximately caused by the included peril fire, even
though the excluded peril earthquake remotely contributed to the harm. Id. at 371, 111 P. at
5. Under the court's construction of §§ 530 and 532 the loss would not have been covered if
the earthquake, rather than the fire, was the proximate cause of the loss. Id. See supra notes
21-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Pacific Heating case.
47. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 33-34, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696. The Sabella court
cited the Brooks rule as compelling the use of the efficient proximate cause standard for deter-
mining property insurance coverage, as well as life insurance coverage. Id. at 32, 377 P.2d at
896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Brooks.
48. Id. at 31, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
49. Id. at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
50. See, eg., Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965)
(windstorm (included peril) rather than wave action (excluded peril) found to be dominant or
efficient cause of insured's damaged dock); Sauer v. General Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 37
Cal. Rptr. 303 (1964) (leaky waterpipe (included peril) rather than settling of the earth (ex-
cluded peril) efficient proximate cause of insured's loss).
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2. The "concurrent cause" standard
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge,"1 State
Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) issued the insured an automobile
liability policy and a homeowner's policy. 2 The insured, Mr. Partridge,
was subsequently held liable for the accidental shooting of a passenger in
his vehicle which occurred while on a hunting trip. 3 Prior to the shoot-
ing Mr. Partridge had "modified" his .357 Magnum by filing down the
trigger mechanism to produce a "hair trigger."54 The accident occurred
when the vehicle hit a bump in the road causing Partridge's gun to dis-
charge within the automobile, injuring one of the passengers.5
State Farm admitted coverage under the automobile liability policy,
but claimed the accident was not covered by the homeowner's liability
policy because it excluded coverage for injuries arising out of the use of
motor vehicles. 6 Partridge, on the other hand, contended that the exclu-
sionary clause was inapplicable because both the negligent driving and
the filing of the trigger mechanism were independent concurrent causes
of the victim's injury. 7 The California Supreme Court agreed with the
insured, holding that when an insured risk and an excluded risk "consti-
tute concurrent proximate causes of an accident, the insurer is liable so
long as one of the causes is covered by the policy."58 The court stated
that:
Although the accident occurred in a vehicle, the insured's neg-
ligent modification of the gun suffices, in itself, to render him
fully liable for the resulting injuries. . . . [I]nasmuch as the
liability of the insured arises from his non-auto-related conduct,
and exists independently of any 'use' of his car, we believe the
homeowner's policy covers that liability.59
51. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
52. Id. at 96, 514 P.2d at 124, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
53. Id. at 98, 514 P.2d at 125-26, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14.
54. Id. at 97, 514 P.2d at 125, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
55. Id. at 98, 514 P.2d at 125, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
56. Id. at 99, 514 P.2d at 126, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The victim sought to recover
$500,000 in damages from Partridge and coverage under Partridge's automobile liability policy
was limited to $15,000. Id. at 98, 514 P.2d at 126, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
57. Id. at 99, 514 P.2d at 126-27, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
58. Id. at 102, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
59. Id. at 103, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817. The court used the following hypo-
thetical to explain its conclusion:
If, after negligently modifying the gun, Partridge had lent it to a friend who had then
driven his own insured car negligently, resulting in the firing of the gun and injuring
of a passenger, both Partridge and his friend under traditional joint tortfeasor princi-
ples would be liable for the injury. In such circumstances, Partridge's personal liabil-
ity would surely be covered by his homeowner's policy, and his friend's liability
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The court briefly discussed the Sabella efficient proximate cause
standard, but stated "that coverage under a liability insurance policy is
equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes sim-
ply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries."' 60 The court empha-
sized that the concurrent cause analysis was an appropriate coverage
determination standard under a liability policy, and did not speak to its
applicability under any other type of policy.
6 1
Approximately nine years after Partridge, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in dictum, appeared to sanction the use of
the concurrent cause standard for determining coverage under a first
party property insurance policy.62 In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.
Guyton,63 the insureds sustained property damage as a result of a flood
caused by a hurricane.' The property owners held "all-risk" home-
owner's policies that covered losses due to third party negligence, but
excluded coverage for losses "CAUSED BY, RESULTING FROM,
CONTRIBUTED TO OR AGGRAVATED BY" flood or flood waters.65
The insurer denied the insureds' claims based on this exclusion and
sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that the language
of the policies in question specifically excluded coverage for flood dam-
age. 66 The insureds claimed that the negligence of the water district in
maintaining the flood control system proximately caused the damage to
the insureds' homes and was therefore covered under the policies as a
loss resulting from third party negligence.67
The district court agreed with the insurer, holding that under the
would be covered by automobile insurance. When viewed from this perspective, it
can be seen that State Farm is presently attempting to escape liability under the
homeowner's policy simply because, in the instant case, both negligent acts happened
to have been committed by a single tortfeasor. In our view, this coincidence cannot
defeat the insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured for liability arising from non-
automobile risks.
Id.
60. Id. at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at 102-05, 514 P.2d at 129-30, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18. A liability policy is
designed to cover damages awarded to third parties arising out of the negligence of the insured.
The insurer becomes obligated to pay when a legally enforceable judgment has been rendered
against the insured. See E. VAUGHN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 445 (3d ed.
1982).
62. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982). A first party policy
protects the holder against damage to the insured property caused by covered perils. Unlike
the liability policy, which indemnifies the insured for injuries to third parties, the first party
policy provides coverage for losses sustained by the insured himself.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 552.
65. Id. at 552-53.
66. Id. at 553. The suit was filed in federal court based on diversity. Id.
67. Id.
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Sabella efficient proximate cause standard, even if the negligence of the
water district was a proximate cause of the losses in question, the flood
was the "efficient" proximate cause such that the exclusionary clause
contained in the policy was fully operational.68
On appeal the circuit court found that the district court had "misin-
terpreted California law," and declined to use the Sabella standard stat-
ing that under the facts presented its application "appears forced and
arbitrary."69 The court instead applied Partridge's concurrent proximate
cause standard, and found that it was dispositive in the policyholder's
favor.70 The court determined that the exclusionary clause would not
apply if the Water District's negligence was a proximate cause of the
loss.7 1 The court failed to mention that in Partridge the concurrent prox-
imate cause standard had been applied to a liability policy, not to a first
party property insurance policy, such as that issued by the defendant
insurer in Guyton. 2
Only one year later the California court of appeal, in Premier Insur-
ance Co. v. Welch,73 embraced the Guyton court's use of the concurrent
proximate cause standard for determining coverage under first party poli-
cies.74 In Premier, a case factually similar to Sabella, the insured's home
was destroyed in a landslide caused by the negligent installation of a sub-
drain beneath the home, in conjunction with particularly heavy rains.7
The insured's policy contained the standard exclusion for damage caused
by water movement of any kind.76 The insurer denied coverage based
68. Id.
69. Id. at 554 n.3.
70. Id. at 555.
71. Id.
72. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818. See infra notes
128-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of extending the concurrent
cause standard to first party policies.
73. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
74. Id. at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
75. Id. at 722-23, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
76. Id. at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 659. The policy read as follows:
Exclusions:
THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST LOSS:
1. CAUSED BY, RESULTING FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO OR AGGRAVATED BY ANY
OF THE FOLLOWING:
(A) FLOOD, SURFACE WATER, WAVES, TIDAL WATER OR TIDAL WAVES,
OVERFLOW OF STREAMS OR OTHER BODIES OF WATER, OR SPRAY FROM ANY OF
THE FOREGOING, ALL WHETHER DRIVEN BY WIND OR NOT;
(B) WATER WHICH BACKS UP THROUGH SEWERS OR DRAINS: OR
(C) WATER BELOW THE SURFACE OR THE GROUND INCLUDING THAT
WHICH EXERTS PRESSURE ON OR FLOWS, SEEPS OR LEAKS THROUGH SIDEWALKS,
DRIVEWAYS, FOUNDATIONS, WALLS, BASEMENT OR OTHER FLOORS OR THROUGH
DOORS, WINDOWS, OR ANY OTHER OPENINGS IN SUCH SIDEWALKS, DRIVEWAYS,
FOUNDATIONS, WALLS, OR FLOORS; UNLESS LOSS BY FIRE OR EXPLOSION ENSUES,
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upon this exclusion. The trial court agreed, finding the heavy rainfall to
be the "efficient proximate cause" of the loss." The court of appeal dis-
agreed with the trial court's analysis under the efficient proximate cause
theory and reversed, stating that "[w]hile it is true that the heavy rainfall
was the first link in the causal sequence, the immediate or proximate
cause of loss was the damage to the drain which set in motion the chain
of events leading to the ultimate destruction of the dwelling.""8
Although the court utilized the efficient proximate cause standard,
in dictum, the court stated that, in the alternative,
the damaged subdrain was, at the very least, a concurrent prox-
imate cause of the property loss incurred by appellants which
ipso facto gave rise to respondent's liability in spite of the fact
that the rainfall, an excluded peril, and the earth movement
resulting therefrom may also have constituted a proximate
cause.
79
The court cited Partridge and Guyton as supporting its position. 0
The emergence of concurrent causation as the appropriate standard
continued in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams,"1 a recent case ad-
dressing the multiple causation issue.
III. FARMERS INSURANcE EXCHANGE V ADAMS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams,82 the California court of
appeal grappled with the question of whether the efficient proximate
cause analysis "is necessarily the only analysis to be utilized in determin-
ing an insurer's liability for loss under an all-risk homeowner's policy." 3
The insureds' property was damaged due to "earth movement" following
an unusually heavy rainstorm. 4 The policies in question excluded losses
due to earth movement or water damage, but permitted coverage for
losses due to third party negligence. s5 The insurer sought a declaratory
judgment that the damage to the insureds' property was not covered
AND THIS COMPANY SHALL THEN BE LIABLE ONLY FOR SUCH ENSUING Loss,
BUT THESE EXCLUSIONS Do NOT APPLY TO Loss BY THEFT.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
79. Id. at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
80. Id.
81. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
82. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).




under the policy because the "efficient proximate cause" of the loss was
earth movement, an excluded cause.
86
The court of appeal rejected the insurer's assertion that the efficient
proximate cause standard was the sole analysis applicable to multiple
causation cases.87 The court discussed the history of the efficient proxi-
mate cause standard beginning with Sabella v. Wisler,88 but stated that
its existence did not "foreclos[e] the likelihood of 'a concurrent proxi-
mate cause' analysis being applied to an appropriate factual situation."8 9
The court stated that "Itihe Partridge, Premier and Safeco cases reveal
that in an appropriate case coverage may be found not only where the
included risk is the efficient or moving cause of the harm, but also where
an included risk is a concurrent proximate cause of the harm."90 The
court concluded, on the basis of Premier Insurance Co. v. Welch and
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton that the insureds were cov-
ered if they could prove that third party negligence, an included peril,
was a "concurrent proximate cause" of the loss. 91 The court, however,
did not overrule the efficient proximate cause standard, stating instead
that a blanket declaration in favor of any one standard was inappropriate
given the numerous claims involved (over 300), each with varying fact
patterns.92
IV. ANALYSIS
In the wake of Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams, 93 the viabil-
ity of Sabella v. Wisler's94 efficient proximate cause standard has been
cast in doubt. Because the concurrent cause theory is a broader standard
of coverage, a peril that rises to the level of an efficient proximate cause
will also meet the "concurrent cause" test. Thus, the efficient proximate
cause standard becomes superfluous.
86. Id. at 715-16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
87. Id. at 718, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
88. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
89. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 718-19, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The Adams court cited the
court of appeal's decision in Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr.
868 (1965), as expressly limiting the application of the efficient proximate cause standard to
fact patterns similar to those of Sabella and its progeny. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 718-19,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
90. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 722, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. (citing Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983)
and Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982)).
92. Id. at 715, 722, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 289, 294.
93. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
94. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
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A. Sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance Code
A major controversy surrounding the concurrent cause standard
concerns its impact on sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance
Code. The court in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams,9 like its
predecessors, failed to adequately address this issue.
In Sabella v. Wisler, the California Supreme Court held that if a
strict construction of section 532 were allowed:
where an excepted peril operated to any extent in the chain of
causation so that the resulting harm would not have occurred
"but for" the excepted peril's operation, the insurer would be
exempt even though an insured peril was the proximate cause
of the loss. Such a result would be directly contrary to the pro-
vision in section 530, in accordance with the general rule, for
liablility of the insurer where the peril insured against proxi-
mately results in the loss.9 6
Thus, the court explained, sections 530 and 532 must be read in conjunc-
tion with one another, such that the excluded peril without "which the
loss would not have occurred, is the peril proximately causing the
loss." 97 Thus, coverage is denied only where the excluded peril is the
proximate cause of the loss. This interpretation of sections 530 and 532
gives meaning to two seemingly irreconcilable provisions in the law, and
prevents insurers from statutorily expanding the scope of the exclusions
contained in their policies.98
95. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
96. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 33, 377 P.2d 889, 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696 (1963) (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 33-34, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (citation omitted). The Sabella
interpretation of §§ 530 and 532 is not without precedent. In Pacific Heating and Ventilating
Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 158 Cal. 367, 372, 111 P. 4, 6 (1910), the court held
that §§ 2626 and 2628 of the California Civil Code (from which Insurance Code §§ 530 and
532 were adopted) must be read in conjunction with one another. See supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text for full discussion. The Pacific Heating court, as did the court in Sabella,
refused to broaden the scope of the policy exception in question by applying a strict construc-
tion of the "but for" language of § 2628. Pacific Heating, 158 Cal. at 373, 111 P. at 6.
98. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696. In Pacific Heating, the
insured's policy only excluded loss by fire directly caused by an earthquake, not, as was the
case, loss by fire remotely resulting therefrom. 158 Cal. at 373, 111 P. at 6. A strict applica-
tion of then § 2628 would have expanded the scope of the exclusion to include losses in any
way contributed to by earthquake no matter how remote its effects, so long as the loss would
not have occurred without it. Id. The court rejected this interpretation stating that while it
was their duty to "carry out the contracts as made by the parties..., [the court must], at the
same time, prevent if possible the exceptions and conditions from wholly devouring the pol-
icy." Id. at 370, 111 P. at 5. The court noted that "the plain common-sense reading of the
policy would convey no information to plaintiff that he could not recover if the cause of the fire
was an earthquake." Id. at 371, 111 P. at 5.
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In enunciating the concurrent cause standard, the court in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge99 engaged in only a
cursory discussion of sections 530 and 532, which it relegated to a single
footnote."° There, the court asserted that its "concurrent cause" stan-
dard was "consistent with Insurance Code sections 530 and 532, as au-
thoritatively construed in Sabella v. Wisler ... ."101 The court then
discussed Sabella's rejection of the strict "but for" interpretation of sec-
tion 532 sought by the insurer. However, the court made no attempt to
explain how the concurrent cause standard was consistent with section
532 when read in conjunction with section 530, as required by Sabella
10 2
To a certain extent, an examination of the relevant Insurance Code
sections in light of the concurrent cause standard becomes an exercise in
semantics. Section 530 speaks in terms of proximate and remote
causes.103 Accordingly, in order to give both sections effect, section 532
must also be construed in terms of proximate and remote perils. 1 4
Under Sabella, the insured's claim will not be covered if the excepted
"but for" peril was the proximate cause of the loss.105 Under the concur-
rent cause standard, however, "coverage is available whenever an insured
risk constitutes a proximate cause . , even if an excluded risk is a
concurrent proximate cause... ,,.06 The concurrent cause standard ren-
ders section 532 virtually meaningless. It would only apply to deny cov-
erage when all of the "but for" proximate causes are excluded.107 If all
proximate causes of a loss are excluded (i.e., none of the included perils
have risen to the level of a proximate cause) then section 532 is needless
since there is no dispute regarding coverage. Under the express terms of
the policy, the loss is excluded.108 Thus, section 532 becomes superflu-
ous. This is contrary to the general rule that a statute must be inter-
preted in a manner which gives it meaning and validity,10 9 yet Partridge,
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton, Premier Insurance Co. v.
99. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
100. Id. at 105 n.l1, 514 P.2d at 130 n.ll, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.l1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1972).
104. See Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 105 n.11, 514 P.2d at 130 n.11, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.11;
Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
105. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
106. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 105 n.ll, 514 P.2d at 130 n.ll, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.ll.
107. See 0. Becker, P. Levin, & C. Holland, supra note 18, at 50. So long as an included
concurrent proximate cause exists, § 532 will not apply. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Turner v. Board of Trustees, Calexico Unified School Dist., 16 Cal. 3d 818, 548
P.2d 1115, 129 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976).
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Welch110 and Adams failed to discuss the viability of section 532 under a
concurrent cause interpretation.'
B. The Scope of the Concurrent Cause Standard
Another criticism of the concurrent cause standard concerns the un-
defined scope of its application. In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Ad-
ams,1 2 the court stated that "in an appropriate case coverage may be
found not only where the included risk is the efficient or moving cause of
the harm, but also where an included risk is a concurrent proximate
cause of the harm." '13 The Adams decision, however, does not indicate
when it is "appropriate" to apply the concurrent cause standard, which
leaves insurers without guidance in handling future claims. Apparently,
the court assumed the application of the concurrent cause standard was
clear. An examination of the cases preceding Adams, however, illus-
trates that courts have applied the concurrent cause standard in a variety
of factual settings and not on a consistent basis.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge,"I4 the
court applied the concurrent cause standard to a liability policy where
the insured's negligent acts, one an included peril and the other an ex-
cluded peril, operated simultaneously to produce the harm. 115 This stan-
dard was also employed in Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Guyton, 6
to afford coverage under first party policies where the negligent mainte-
nance of the flood control system combined with heavy rains and flood-
110. Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
111. Instead, the Partridge court maintained that its holding was supported by dictum
found in Hughes v. Potomac Insurance Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239 (1962), which stated that
"'[i]t has been held that when two causes join in causing an injury, one of which is insured
against, the insured is covered by the policy .... '" Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 105, 514 P.2d at
131, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (quoting Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 244, 18
Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1962) (citing Zimmerman v. Continental Ins. Co., 99 Cal. App. 723, 726,
279 P. 464, 465 (1929))). However, in both Hughes and Zimmerman, from which this asser-
tion originated, the court found in favor of the insured based upon the application of the
efficient proximate cause standard. Hughes, 199 Cal. App. 2d at 244, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 652;
Zimmerman, 99 Cal. App. at 726, 279 P. at 465. In Zimmerman, immediately following the
dictum in question, in fact in the same sentence, the court held that "while from the nature of
the accident and other circumstances shown different conclusions might be drawn, the infer-
ence which appears to have been drawn by the trial court that the insured was struck by the
car is not unreasonable and is supported by the evidence. 99 Cal. App. at 726, 279 P. at 465.
The court's holding is consistent with the efficient proximate cause standard.
112. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
113. Id. at 722, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (emphasis in original).
114. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
115. Id. at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
116. 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ing to concurrently cause the insureds' losses.1 17 In both Partridge and
Safeco the simultaneous operation of an included peril and an excluded
peril was held to have caused the loss and, thus, triggered the application
of the concurrent cause standard. 118
In the next case to examine the multiple causation issue, Premier
Insurance Co. v. Welch, 1 9 a case factually similar to Sabella v. Wisler,1
20
the court held that the negligent installation of a subdrain (an included
peril), rather than the heavy rainfall (an excluded peril) was the "efficient
cause of the loss.' ' 121 In dictum, the court additionally stated that:
[T]he judgment at bench must be reversed for the second rea-
son spelled out by [the insureds]: i.e., that the damaged sub-
drain was, at the very least, a concurrent proximate cause of
the property loss incurred by appellants which ipso facto gave
rise to respondent's liability in spite of the fact that the rainfall,
an excluded peril, and the earth movement resulting therefrom
may also have constituted a proximate cause.' 22
In stating that the concurrent cause standard would also apply, the
Premier court expanded the standard's application. The unifying princi-
ple of Partridge and Safeco lay in the temporal connection between the
concurrent causes-simultaneous occurrence. Yet in Premier the negli-
gence preceded the operation of the excluded peril. 123
The confusion regarding the applicability of each standard has not
been resolved in subsequent decisions, including Adams. The Adams
court attempted to distinguish the applicability of each standard on tem-
poral grounds (i.e., whether the operation of the included peril preceded
or occurred simultaneously with the excluded peril).' 24 Yet the court
approved Premier's application of both standards in a situation which, if
117. Id. at 553-55. The negligence which gave rise to the insurer's liability in Safeco can be
distinguished from that which occurred in Sabella, in which the court applied the efficient
proximate cause standard. See id.; see also Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 26, 377 P.2d 889,
892, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 692 (1963). In Sabella both the negligent compaction of the soil be-
neath the insured's house and the negligent installation of the sewer line occurred prior to the
operation of the excluded peril. Id. at 24-27, 377 P.2d at 891-92, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92. In
Safeco, the city's failure to properly maintain the flood control system was a continuing act of
negligence which occurred simultaneously with the excluded peril to produce the harm.
Safeco, 692 F.2d at 553-55.
118. Safeco, 692 F.2d at 553-55; Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal.
Rptr. at 818.
119. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
120. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
121. Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
122. Id. at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
123. Id. at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
124. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 718, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
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based upon a temporal distinction, would have required the use of the
efficient cause standard by itself.125  It appears, however, that the
courts-including Adams-are now treating the dictum contained in
Premier as an alternative holding prescribing insurer liability any time an
included concurrent proximate cause can be identified. 126 The insured
need no longer show that the included peril was the "dominant or effi-
cient cause" of the loss. It is enough that the excluded peril is a concur-
rent proximate cause.' 27
C. The Application of the Concurrent Proximate Cause Standard to
First Party Insurance
The decision to apply the concurrent proximate cause standard to
first party property insurance has been widely criticized.128 The court in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge,129 which first
adopted this standard, specifically held that it was to apply to coverage
determinations under a "liability insurance policy.' 30 Yet, the Ninth
Circuit in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton, 13 1 and later the
California court of appeal in Premier Insurance Co. v. Welch 132 extended
the application of the concurrent cause standard to include first party
policies without any discussion of the possible consequences of this exten-
sion, in fact, without any discussion at all.133 While extending the effi-
cient proximate cause standard to first party property insurance is not
clearly erroneous, the court owes at least some explanation of why the
extension was merited. Unfortunately, subsequent decisions, including
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams have also failed to justify this
extension.
125. Id. at 720-21, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. The court's attempted temporal distinction
regarding the applicability of each standard is arbitrary and unnecessary. To predicate liability
on the order of occurrence of multiple perils leaves the issue of coverage to be decided by
fortuity, a result which undermines the goal of contracting parties--certainty.
126. Id. at 722, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
127. See, e.g., id., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 294; Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
661.
128. See, eg., Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for
Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985).
129. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
130. Id. at 104-05, 514 P.2d 123, 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 818 (1973).
131. 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982).
132. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
133. See Safeco, 692 F.2d at 555; Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
661-62. It is important to note that the decisions of the circuit court are not binding upon the
state courts contained in the area of their federal jurisdiction. Yet, the California Court of
Appeal in Premier cited Safeco as dispositive in the insured's favor. Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d
at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
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1. Distinguishing first party and third party policies
In an effort to demonstrate the impropriety of enlarging the applica-
tion of the concurrent cause standard, insurance industry advocates have
attempted to distinguish liability and first party policies."' They assert
that under a first party policy, coverage determinations are based upon
contract principles.1 35 Coverage is not predicated on fault but on the
occurrence of a peril intended to be covered by the contract. 136 Under a
liability policy, however, insurance company attorneys have argued that:
[T]he right to indemnity... does not arise upon the happening
of a physical event .... Rather, coverage is provided only if
the insured is found legally liable based upon principles of tort
law. Such a coverage determination turns on an examination of
tort principles of liability.... Those courts which have dealt
with this distinction have focused on the difference between
duty, foreseeability and fault on the one hand, and the reason-
able expectations of the insured and insurer on the other. 3
Insurance advocates find support for their argument in Bird v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,38 in which Justice Cardozo stated that:
in the law of torts.., there is a tendency to go farther back in
the search for causes than there is in the law of contracts. Es-
pecialy in the law of insurance, the rule is that, "You are not to
trouble yourself with distant causes." "In an action on a pol-
icy, the causa proxima is alone considered in ascertaining the
cause of loss; but in cases of other contracts and in questions of
tort the causa causans is by no means disregarded."' '3 9
Thus, industry advocates assert that under insurance contracts the con-
cept of causation is wedded to the reasonable expectations of the parties,
while under liability policies causation is determined strictly upon tort
principles.
These attempted distinctions are unpersuasive. First, under a liabil-
ity policy, the initial finding of the insured's liability is clearly decided
upon principles of tort law. But whether a particular tort liability is cov-
ered by the policy, is determined, as is coverage under a first party policy,
134. See, e.g., 0. Becker, P. Levin & C. Holland, supra note 18, at 42-44; Bragg, supra note
128, at 386.
135. 0. Becker, P. Levin & C. Holland, supra note 18, at 42-44.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 43-44.
138. 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
139. Id. at 49, 120 N.E. at 88 (quoting Fenton v. Thorley & Co., A.C. 443, 454 (1903)).
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upon principles of contract law.140 While still a causa proxima, the effi-
cient cause is a tort-like concept and, as such, blurs the theoretical purity
between tort and contract.
Finally, looking to the parties' intentions as suggested by insurance
company attorneys, is not the answer it appears to be. Given insurance
sales methods and the adhesive nature of insurance contracts, the expec-
tations of the parties may not be reflected in the contract. 14, Even if
coverage against flood or earthquake is available at an additional pre-
mium, the consumer's failure to purchase such coverage may not be an
informed decision. 42 The purchaser may not have been adequately in-
formed of what perils were not covered, and may not have received infor-
mation as to the availability of additional coverage.
143
2. The economic impact of extending the concurrent cause standard
from first party to third party policies
A better argument counseling against the use of the concurrent
cause standard for coverage determinations under first party policies can
be found in the economic impact of its application. The overall economic
effects of utilizing the concurrent cause standard in connection with lia-
bility policies are minimal. In Partridge, the use of the concurrent cause
standard was necessary to provide coverage under a rather bizarre set of
circumstances. 144 The insured committed two negligent acts (filing the
trigger of his gun and driving recklessly); the latter falling squarely
within an exclusion of the policy.' 45 Such a situation is unlikely to occur
with great frequency, and the concurrent cause standard is equally un-
likely to affect coverage determinations under most homeowners' liability
policies.
The concurrent cause standard, however, may affect coverage under
virtually every first party property insurance policy issued in this state.
The destruction of insured property is frequently caused by the operation
of multiple perils and thus may trigger the application of the concurrent
cause standard. Each new claim presented to the insurer must now be
140. See E. VAUGHAN, supra note 61, at 445.
141. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of insurance policies
and sales methods.
142. See infra note 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of earthquake coverage at
additional premiums.
143. See infra note 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of a possible way to insure
the protection of the parties' reasonable expectations.
144. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 97-98, 514 P.2d at 125-26, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14. See supra
notes 51-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Partridge.
145. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 98-99, 514 P.2d at 126-27, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
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examined in light of this broad coverage standard. Accordingly, insur-
ance companies may face extended liability on a potentially overwhelm-
ing number of claims.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ADAMS DECISION
The significance of Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams 146 lies in
its uncritical acceptance of the concurrent cause line of cases, which have
expanded liability for insurers. Dispensing with potentially arbitrary
temporal distinctions, the concurrent cause analysis assesses liability any
time an included peril rises to the level of a proximate cause, even though
it may not have been the primary or dominant cause of the harm.'47 By
eliminating the requirement that the included peril be the dominant
cause of the harm, the court has removed the element of fairness from
the coverage determination process. The court in Sabella v. Wisler'48
sought to preserve this element-for the insured-when it refused to
adopt a construction of California Insurance Code section 532 which
would have denied coverage every time the loss would not have occurred
"but for" the operation of an excluded peril, no matter how remote its
effects.' 4 9 The strict "but for" construction of section 532 was patently
unfair in that it could be invoked to deny coverage in practically every
instance of concurrent causation, even though the proximate cause of the
harm was an included peril.'5 ° By the same token, the concurrent cause
standard is unfair to the insurer in that it will almost always establish
insurer liability since the insured peril need no longer be the primary
cause of the loss. This is particularly true given that third party negli-
gence is considered an included peril. If a home fails to withstand the
forces of nature, it could be claimed, arguably, to have been negligently
constructed. Similarly, the existence of a flood control system which
later fails could be considered evidence of negligent construction, mainte-
nance or planning. The ease with which one can point to third party
negligence as a proximate cause of a loss illustrates the need for a fairness
requirement to avoid the kind of lopsided determinations which the
Sabella court found unacceptable.
15 1
146. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
147. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 104-05, 514 P.2d 123,
130-31, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 818-19 (1973).
148. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
149. Id. at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
150. Id.
151. An underlying problem is the doctrinal weakness of proximate cause. Proximate cause
has never really been more than a legal conclusion that justified a court's decision. If the court
wanted to find liability, the negligent act was proximate; if liability was not to be imposed the
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Given the current state of the law, an insurer's attempts to deny
liability on the mistaken belief that the Sabella standard is applicable to a
particular claim, may prove extremely improvident.'52 The insurer is left
with two alternatives: either provide coverage whenever third party neg-
ligence can be found; or litigate each claim and face the possibility of a
bad faith award with every defeat. Neither alternative is an attractive
one.
A. The Independent Concurrent Proximate Cause Standard
As State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge 15 3 and
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton 154 illustrate, it is not always
possible to identify the efficient or moving cause of a loss as required by
the Sabella v. Wisler standard. 5' Accordingly, it is unfair to force the
judiciary to make arbitrary decisions when a standard becomes unwork-
able in a given situation. However, the concurrent cause standard, as
articulated in Partridge, is broad and highly susceptible to an expansive
interpretation.
56
One court's recent response, in Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casu-
alty Co., was to require the included and excluded perils to be independ-
ent proximate causes of the harm in order to satisfy the Partridge
standard. 57 This construction has surface appeal. If the causes are not
independent, the Sabella standard applies to distinguish the "moving or
efficient cause."' 58 The Garvey court finds support for its "indepen-
dence" requirement in Partridge itself, in which the court referred to the
insured's negligent acts as "independent, concurrent proximate causes"
of the victim's injuries." 9 The Partridge court held, however, that cover-
negligent act was remote. Without an identifiable internal structure or guiding principles
proximate causation remains an inconsistent standard.
152. Adding insult to injury, if an insurer attempts to assert the contractual rights justifia-
bly thought to exist under the clear language of the policy, the insurer may be penalized in the
form of an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Garvey v. State
Farm Fire & Causalty Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 929, 227 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1986), review granted,
Sept. 18, 1986 (SF25060); see infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Garvey. Even if the bad faith claim is determined to be frivolous, it has nuisance value and
may be costly to the insurer in terms of both money and loss of reputation.
153. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
154. 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982).
155. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
156. The literal slippery slope.
157. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 929, 227 Cal. Rptr. 209
(1986), review granted, Sept. 18, 1986 (SF25060).
158. Id. at 935-37, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
159. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 99, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815; see also Garvey, 181
Cal. App. 3d at 935 n.5, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 213 n.5. The Partridge court further stated that
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age was available "whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concur-
rent proximate cause" of the harm.161 Yet the Garvey court
presumptively states that the Partridge opinion must be viewed as a
whole, compelling the conclusion reached by "every other court that has
faced the question, that the covered risk must exist independently of the
excluded risk before policy coverage may be found under Partridge's con-
current proximate cause analysis." 
161
The court cites numerous decisions as supporting an independent
concurrent cause standard in an attempt to demonstrate the uniformity
of its application. 62 A close examination of the cases, however, reveals
past inconsistency. For example, in National Indemnity Co. v. Farmers
Home Mutual Insurance Co.,' 63 the insured negligently allowed a child
she was babysitting to leave her car and run into the street where the
child was struck and killed by a passing car. 64 The court held that the
insured's failure to supervise the child (an included peril) was not in-
dependent of the use of the automobile (an excluded peril).' 65 In other
words, the insured's failure to supervise was negligent only in relation to
the danger posed by the use of the automobile.' 66 But in Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,167 a case factually
sinilar to National Indemnity, the opposite conclusion was reached.
68
In Ohio Casualty, the insured negligently allowed a young girl to dive
from his boat into a lake where she was immediately run over by another
boat. 169 The court found that the insured's failure to adequately survey
the surrounding area while he was responsible for the girl's safety (a cov-
ered risk) was independent of her dive from the boat (an excluded risk)
"[t]here were two separate, distinct and different acts of negligence committed by [the insured],
one of which was entirely disconnected with the use of a motor vehicle [the excluded peril]."
Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 100, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815; see also Garvey, 181 Cal.
App. 3d at 934, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
160. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
161. Garvey, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 935, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 213. The court of appeal goes so far
as to claim that the independence requirement was implicit in its decision in Premier Insurance
Co. v. Welch, where the court articulated its alternative holding that coverage was available to
the insured under both the efficient proximate cause standard and the concurrent cause stan-
dard. Id. at 936, 942-43, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 218; see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Premier decision. An examination of Premier reveals that the Garvey
court is unreasonably attempting to stretch the Premier holding.
162. Garvey, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 938-41, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 215-17.
163. 95 Cal. App. 3d 102, 157 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1979).
164. Id. at 104-05, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100.
165. Id. at 108-09, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
166. Id.
167. 148 Cal. App. 3d 641, 196 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1983).
168. Id. at 647-48, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69.
169. Id. at 643, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
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and awarded coverage under the insured's policy. 170 The results of these
two cases are clearly at odds, and the Garvey court does little more than
assert that National Indemnity was improperly decided.'
71
Still, Garvey attempts to limit the applicability of the concurrent
cause standard, and perhaps represents a step in the right direction. The
new standard is theoretically appealing. Unfortunately, even with the
addition of an independence requirement the potential for arbitrary line
drawing remains.
B. Guarding the Parties' Reasonable Expectations: A Written
Declaration of Policy Exceptions
Courts appear to favor the insured in coverage disputes. Given the
nature and importance of an insurance contract, the court's bias is per-
haps justified. The insurance contract is one of adhesion, since the poten-
tial policyholder is unable to bargain with the insurer and must either
accept or reject the policy terms as offered." 2 While he or she is free to
engage another insurer, policy language is generally standard throughout
the industry, providing little incentive to shop around other than with
regard to premium rates.
7 3
The method by which insurance is sold compounds the unequal po-
sition of the insured. The insurance agent usually describes policy limits,
general coverage information, deductibles and premiums, but the pro-
spective purchasers rarely view the policy itself until after the insurance
is purchased. 174 The contract to purchase insurance is separate from the
actual policy, which usually arrives in the mail several weeks later. The
buyer is thus dependent upon the representations of the insurance agent
as to the coverage provided under the policy.
Not surprisingly, the potential policyholder's reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage at the time the insurance is purchased may differ from
what later, at the time of claim resolution, appears reasonable under the
language of the policy. Given industry sales methods, an insurer's argu-
ments to the effect that unambiguous exclusionary language should be
the sole determinative factor in resolving coverage disputes are unpersua-
sive. The insured may reasonably expect coverage for losses caused by
the negligent acts of another, and the fact that the negligence caused an
excluded peril to damage the property may not reduce the insured's ex-
170. Id. at 647-48, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69.
171. Garvey, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 939 n.8, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 216 n.8.
172. E. VAUGHN, supra note 61, at 169.
173. Id. at 161.
174. Id. at 150.
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pectations of coverage. The insured may realize that his or her policy
does not cover losses due to a naturally occurring mudslide, but may
expect coverage for losses due to a mudslide caused by the negligence of
others. This is particularly true where no contrary indication has been
given by the insurance agent.
If an insurance company does not wish to provide coverage for
losses in any way caused by the typically excluded perils, whether con-
tributed to by third party negligence or not, then the company should say
so explicitly. Moreover, this information should not only be contained in
the policy, but also in a written statement which would be fully explained
by the insurance agent and signed by the prospective policyholder at the
time the insurance is purchased.
Under current law, the insurance agent must affirmatively state that
earthquake coverage is not provided under the basic homeowner's policy,
and that if the customer desires such coverage it will be provided at a
separate premium. 175 This law ensures that potential policyholders are
not misled with regard to earthquake coverage, and insurers are secure in
the knowledge that they will not be forced to pay claims for earthquake
damage which the premiums were not calculated to cover. Since the in-
surer must already explain the earthquake exclusion to prospective pur-
chasers, it would be a simple matter to require all exclusions contained in
the policy to be explained in writing prior to the sale of homeowner's
insurance. In this way, the expectations of both parties would be better
protected.
While this proposal is not in itself a solution to the problems of con-
current causation, it may help to avoid misunderstandings which result
in legal disputes and the reliance upon potentially arbitrary coverage
standards.
C. New Policy Language
In the wake of the court of appeal's decision in Premier Insurance
Co. v. Welch, 176 State Farm, the nation's largest insurer, altered its policy
language to address the concurrent causation issue. 177 The insertion of
new policy language denying coverage for losses resulting from the com-
bined operation of included and excluded perils limits the number of
175. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10081-88 (West Supp. 1986).
176. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
177. The new policy language reads as follows:
We do not insure for loss which would not have occurred in the absence of one
or more of the following excluded events. We do not insure for such loss regardless
of: a) the cause of the excluded event; or b) other causes of the loss; or c) whether
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claims to which the concurrent cause standard would be applicable. This
is, of course, assuming that the courts will honor these new policies as
written. It is unhelpful, costly and inefficient for courts to rewrite con-
tracts and the new policy language is designed to avoid this result by
directly addressing the concurrent causation issue. However, if the
courts are so willing to rewrite such clearly unambiguous language as
contained in the policies at issue in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.
Guyton 178 and Premier,179 a question remains as to the degree of judicial
deference which will be afforded the insurance industry's latest attempt
to clearly delineate coverage limitations.
The consequence of a court's failure to honor unambiguous policy
language is to force the insurer to pay awards in excess of the coverage
limits upon which its premiums were based.' 80 Such awards may
threaten the financial solvency of a company. The central aim of any
insurance regulatory system must be the preservation of the solidity of
insurance funds, "for if nothing else, insurance must insure."'8 A
court's decision to bring a whole class of occurrences within coverage
limits may seriously breach the security of these funds, particularly, as in
the instant case, where the court's actions affect a large number of poli-
cies. While it must be acknowledged that insurance companies attempt
other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to pro-
duce the loss.
a. Ordinance or Law, ... [defined] ....
b. Earth Movement,... [defined] ....
c. Water Damage ... [defined] ....
d. Neglect ... [defined] ....
e. War, ... [defined] ....
f. Nuclear Hazard, ... [defined] ....
3. We do not insure for loss consisting of one or more of the items below. Further,
we do not insure for loss described in Paragraphs 1. and 2. immediately above re-
gardless of whether one or more of the following: a) directly or indirectly cause,
contribute to or aggravate the loss; or b) occur before, at the same time, or after the
loss or any cause of the loss:
a. conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of any person, group, organization or
governmental body whether intentional, wrongful, negligent, or without fault;
b. defect, weakness, inadequacy, fault or unsoundness in:
(1) planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting;
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, construction, grading, compaction;
(3) materials used in construction or repair; or
(4) maintenance;
of any property (including land, structures, or improvements of any kind)
whether on or off the residence premises.
State Farm Insurance form 7176 (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
178. 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982).
179. See Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657.
180. See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the The-
ory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 499 (1961).
181. Id. at 480.
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to protect themselves through reinsurance, contingency reserves and sur-
pluses, the degree of coverage expansion enunciated by the courts in Pre-
mier and Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams 18 2 may prove to be in
excess of many companies' reserves, particularly those of smaller institu-
tions. Obviously, insurers can either stop writing all-risk policies or sub-
stantially increase premium rates. However, the resulting harm
(decreased availability of coverage) may outweigh the value of the in-
creased coverage afforded to a limited number of individuals under the
concurrent cause standard. Insurance would then be available only to
those who could afford the higher premiums, a result contrary to the
purpose of the homeowner's policy-to provide coverage against a broad
range of perils at rates which the average homeowner can afford."8 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams'84 decision embraces
the application of the concurrent cause standard for coverage determina-
tions under first party policies. The court's adherence to the concurrent
cause line of cases, in particular Premier Insurance Co. v. Welch,' 8 5 likely
signifies the end of the efficient cause standard. For while the California
Supreme Court has yet to strike it down, its scope has been seriously
undermined by the concurrent cause theory.
The concurrent cause standard provides coverage to the insured
where the operation of an included peril proximately caused the loss,
even though an excluded peril may also have contributed proximately to
the harm. Thus, the courts appear to be protecting the insured's interest
in receiving coverage for losses caused by perils which the insured rea-
sonably expected to be covered by the all-risk policy, and which were not
specifically excluded.
While the protection of the insured's expectations is an important
duty of the courts, they may not go so far as to completely rewrite clearly
unambiguous policies. The consequences of the court's expansion of in-
surer liability, increased premiums and decreased availability of insur-
ance, may outweigh the benefits of increased coverage for a limited
number of insureds.
The confusion created by the existence of two standards and the
resulting extended liability of insurers requires the immediate attention
of the California Supreme Court, if for no other reason than to restore
182. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
183. See E. VAUGHAN, supra note 61, at 150-51.
184. 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1985).
185. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1983).
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certainty to an industry which demands it. Although insurers have at-
tempted to address the concurrent causation dilemma through the inser-
tion of new policy language designed to exclude coverage for losses
resulting from the combined operation of included and excluded perils,
the new language has yet to be tested by the courts. Moreover, the
number of outstanding claims filed prior to the enactment of the new
policies and the potential for bad faith liability accompanying their reso-
lution makes judicial intervention a necessity. Without such action, a
few may benefit at the expense of many.
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